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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE W. SMITH, 
Plaintiff and App·ellant, 
-vs.- Case No. 9290 
D. W. LOERTSCHER, 
Defendant .and Resp-onde.nt. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
(The parties will be refe-rred to as they ap·p,eared 
in the trial court. The numbers in parenthesis refer to 
page number of the reeord.) 
STATE~fENT OF 1THE CASE 
This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment in 
favor of defendant for no cause of action (85). The judg-
ment was based upon .a special verdict of a jury in which 
the jury answered two p·ropositions (83, 84). 
This action is on a written contract for a broke-r's 
commission (Exhibit 1). Plaintiff is the real estate 
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broker and defendant the seller and owner of the land 
involved. The contract provided that if plaintiff found a 
buyer 'vho was ready, able and willing to buy certain 
ranch property located in Summit County, Utah, at the 
listed price and terms, or at any other price or terms to 
which defendant might agree during the life of the con-
tract, then defendant agreed to pay plaintiff a $5,000 
commission. Plaintiff contends that he produced J. Hol-
man Waters, a buyer ready, able and willing to buy said 
property, but defendant's refusal to go through with the 
transaction prevented the sale, but nevertheless entitled 
plaintiff to a cormnission. 
Plaintiff is a real estate broker and had been at-
tempting to locate a ranch for Mr. Waters where he could 
raise cattle ( 101). After considerable discussion de-
fendant signed with plaintiff a listing agreement dated 
F·ebruary 14, 1959 (103-106). The selling price was there 
listed at $128,000, twenty-nine percent down and ten equal 
yearly payments, the buyer to assume the mortgage which 
was on the property, and interest at the rate of 5¥2% 
per annum (See Exhibit 1). 
Thereafter, plaintiff brought Waters to the ranch 
and Waters looked it over and defendant pointed out 
the boundaries and generally showed Mr. Waters over 
the premises (106, 107). 
On the 20th day of February, 1959, Mr. Waters made 
an offe-r in writing wherein he offered to p·ay $125,000; 
Twenty 'Thousand ($20,000) Dollars down, Twenty Three 
Thousand ($23,000) Dollars being the unpaid balance 
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of a 1nortgage which \\·as payable $675.00 annually, and 
the balance of Seventy Seven Thousand ($77,000) D·ollars 
to be pay·able in 12 equal, annual payments together with 
interest on the unpaid balance at the rate of 5% p·er 
annu1n (Exhibit 4). Possession date was on or before 
~larch 20, 1959. The offer \vas delivered February 20 
to defendant ( 119) and t,,~o or three days late·r he told 
plaintiff he \Vas going to see a tax expert in connection 
\Vi th the transaction ( 119). 
On February 26, 1959, defendant went to the hotel 
to see plaintiff and both of them went to Mr. W a.ters' 
office ( 122). After discussion plaintiff and defendant 
\Yent to the offiee of R. J. Hogan, an attorney at law, 
\Yho was asked to prepare a vvritten contract for the 
signatures of defendant and l\1:r. Waters: He prepared 
the contract Exhibit 6 (199). On March 6th defendant 
left a copy of this contract on l\1:r. Waters' desk at his 
office in Salt Lake City (128, 200). 
Therafter, on l\.farch 9th, Mr. Waters informed plain-
tiff he objecte-d to the provision that defendant was to 
retain ¥2 of his water right (130, 170). After a 2¥2 
hour discussion defendant and l\fr. Waters went to the 
office of Mr. Hogan for the purpose of having him re-
draft the agreement (172-4, 228). After discussion with 
~1:r. Hogan and defendant Mr. Waters left feeling that 
they had reached a complete agree·ment as to all things 
whieh were to be included in the contract (177). De-
fendant's testimony is to the contrary and that they had 
not resolved the question of the date of when p·ossession 
was to be turned over to Mr. Waters (203). 
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Nothing further was done in connection with the con-
tract until son1e time later, the estimates of time being 
anywhere from 11arch 31st to the middle of April (140, 
215). In any event, at that time defendant 'vent to see 
Mr. Waters at his ranch here in Salt Lake City. There is a 
conflict in the testimony as to exactly what took place. 
Defendant asserts he asked Waters for another and later 
possession date (216). Waters testified defendant merely 
stated he did not want to go through with the deal (178). 
T·he parties stipulated that Mr. Waters was able fi-
nancially to p·erform any of the commitments mentioned 
in the testimony. 
This briefly sets forth the facts and we will discuss 
at greater length the evidence under each particular 
point. The evidence in this case was sufficient to sup-
port a finding for either party. Defendant's testimony 
was to the effect that he and 1\:fr. Waters had never re-
solved all of their differences, p·articularly with relation 
to delivery possession. On the other hand, Waters testi-
fied that complete agree1nent had been reached and he 
had been willing to accept all of the provisions suggested 
by defendant. 
The contentions of plaintiff seeking revers.al, attack 
instructions given and failure to give plaintiff's re-
que~sted instructions. 
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ST'ATEMENT OF POIN'TS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COUR:T ERRED IN REFUSING PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS THAT IF DEFEND-
ANT AND WATERS AGREED TO 'THE PRICE AND TERMS 
OF SALE TO BE PLACED IN 'THE WRIT'TEN CONTRACT 
OF SALE THEN PLAINTIFF HAD PRODUCED A READY, 
ABLE AND WILLING BUYER. 
POIN·T II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY THA'T THE AGREElVIENT BETWEEN DEFENDANT 
AND WATERS WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE. 
POIN·T III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INS'TRUCTING THE 
JURY THA'T THE WRITTEN OFFER DID NOT COMPLY 
WITH THE LISTING AGREEMENT. 
POINT IV. 
THE 'T·RIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRU:GT THE JURY THA'T IF THE PARTIES AGREED 
TO THE PRICE AND 'TERMS FOR THE SALE AND DE-
FENDANT LATER CALLED THE 'TRANSACTION OFF, 
PLAINTIFF WAS EN'TITLED TO A VERDICT. 
POINT' V. 
THE TRIAL COUR·T ERRED IN SUBMIT'TING TO 'THE 
J·URY PROPOSITION NO. 2 AS TO WHE'THER AT THE 
TIME THE LISTING AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED BY DE-
FENDANT PLAINTIFF KNEW THAT DEFENDANT'S WIFE 
WAS A CO-OWNER O·F 'THE PROPERTY. 
ARGill1ENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUES'TED INSTRUCTIONS THAT IF DEFEND-
ANT AND WATERS AGREED TO ·THE PRICE AND TERMS 
OF SALE TO BE PLACED IN 'THE WRIT'TEN CONTRACT 
OF SALE THEN PLAINTIFF HAD PRO-DUCED A READY, 
ABLE AND WILLING BUYER. 
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After the trial court .announced that the case was to 
be submitted to the jury on written interrogatories plain-
tiff sought to have the issues presented to the jury in 
clear and simple languag·e that if defendant and Waters 
agreed to the price and terms which were to be put in 
the contract for the sale of the prop·erty, then plaintiff 
had produced a buyer who was ready and willing to pur-
chase the p·roperty involved. Under sueh circumstances 
plaintiff would be entitled to judgment. Curtis v. Mor-
tensen, 1 Utah 2d 354, 267 P.2d 237; McCormick v. Life 
Insurance Co., 6 Utah 2d 170, 308 P.2d 949'; Hoyt v. Was-
atch Homes, Inc., 1 Utah 2d 9, 261 P.2d 927; Down v. 
DeGroot, 83 ·Cal. App. 155, 256 Pac. 438. The express 
terms of the listing agreement is that plaintiff was to find 
a buyer, not to effect a sale. 
That some provisions were to be left for future 
determination would be immaterial. Agreeing to the 
terms of the sale upon which they were willing to contract 
would constitute a meeting of the minds. That is the 
simple proposition which plaintiff sought to have pre-
sented to the jury by his requested Instruction No. 5 
(52) as follows: 
''INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
"Did the defendant, as the seller, and J. 
Holman Wate·rs, as the buyer, reach a complete 
oral, or verbal understanding as to the price and 
terms which should be placed in the ''Titten con-
tract for the sale of the real estate'" 
This proposition 'vas also succinctly stated in plain-
tiff's requested instruction No. 3 (50) as follows : 
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"INSTRUCTION NO·. 3 
"If the parties agreed as to what matters 
should go into the written contract for the sale 
of the real estate, then a complete agreement was 
reache·d even though other matte~rs were left out, 
or the parties agreed to leave certain matters 
out of the contract, or agreed to leave certain 
matters for future determination. 
"In other words, if the parties agreed to enter 
into an agreement for the sale of the p·roperty and 
agreed to the p·rice and terms which shall go into 
agreement, then they have reached a complete 
understanding for the sale of the prop~erty." 
Instead of following this, the trial court submitted 
the following prop~osition (76, 83) : 
"Proposition No. 1 
"'The defendant, as the seller, and J. Holman 
Waters, the buyer, reache,d a complete oral or 
verbal understanding as to the p-rice and all other 
terms and conditions under which the defendant 
would sell and Mr. Waters would buy the listed 
pToperty.'' 
The jury was told to either answer this false or 
true. Of course, this language needed further clarifica-
tion for the reason that under the p~lain wording of this 
proposition if there were, any terms left to future deter-
mination then all of the terms upon which the defend-
ant and Waters would sell had not been agreed to. The 
court then attempted to shore up this inaccurate language 
by giving Instruction No. 9-G (79) wherein the jury were 
instructed concerning- the meaning of this language. 
There are three obvious objections to this method of pre-
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senting a case. In the first place, Instruction 9-G limits 
those things which could be left to the future when the 
evidence indicates there were a number of other items 
which the .P·arties d~d not intend to place in the contract 
of sale, or at least the jury could have so found. In the 
second place, this instruction giving supposed meaning 
to the sp~ecial verdict is inaccurate and misleading. In 
the third place the jury was going to answer a clearly 
worded proposition and you cannot change the true 
meaning of those words. 
From the testimony introduced in this case a conclu-
sion might be reached that defendant and Waters came 
to a complete agreement as to all things which were to 
be placed in the contract of sale. After the meeting ''ith 
Attorney Hogan, defendant and Waters, !Ir. Waters 
came away with the definite understanding that all terms 
had been agreed to which were to be included in the 
corntract and the only formality left 'vas to put the same 
in written form. He testified as follows (17±): 
"Q. As you left for Mr. Hogan's office was there 
any areas in which there 'vas any disagree-
ment between you on this sale? 
A. Not to be included in the sales contract. 
Q. What was that~ 
A. No, not that were to be included in the sales 
contract." 
Defendant indicated in his testimony that tl1ere were 
some areas where complete agreen1ent had not been 
reached. The jury could have found this to be true, but 
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also could have found that these areas of disagree1nent 
"rere not to be included in the contract of sale. Obviously, 
there was to be nothing put into the contract concerning 
the date defendant 'vas to give up the occup·ation of the 
home (173). He was under the necessity of building a 
new home on the acre retained .and was not exactly sure 
as to when this home would be ready for occup·ancy. Mr. 
Waters te·stified ( 172, 173) there was a discussion con-
cerning the occupancy of the house. This seemed to be 
the 1nain problem .and Mr. Waters was only interested in 
having the house available so that his manager would be 
able to move in and permit his children to go to the Park 
City schools. · They talked of occupancy by September 
1st. Mr. W ate~rs also testified that defendant said that 
he probably could assist in the op·eration of the ranch 
to pay for the occupancy of the· home. Concerning the 
relationship of these matters to the contract of sale, Mr. 
Waters testified (173) : 
"A. The ~fay first date was for p·ossession, al-
though .allowing him to stay in the home, 
which was something which we talked between 
ourselves, having nothing to do with the sale, 
or selling agreement." 
Defendant, concerning his assistance to Mr. Waters 
in the op,eration of the r.anch, testified there was some 
discussion as to whether he would be available to give 
Mr. Waters some advice and indicating that there had 
not been comple·te meeting of the minds on this subject, 
that as Mr. Waters was leaving Mr. Hogan's office he 
made the statement that defendant was to operate this 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
ranch for the use of living in the home. Defendant stated 
thrut he was upset by this because he was not in a posi-
tion to operate his farm, build a home and carry on the 
other obligations that he had ( 217, 218). 
Another area in which the jury could find there had 
not been complete agreement, but which was not to be 
included within the sales contract, was the discussion con-
cerning rights of wa.y for, and installation of, pipe lines 
from the well to the acre reserved by defendant. In re-
gard to this p~ip·e line situation defendant testified (203, 
205): 
"Q. What did you resolve in regard to the pipe-
line from the spring to this building lot~ 
A. We discussed various ways of which we might 
construct this new pipeline, and we never did 
come to an agreement." 
''A. We have a joint ownership of the present 
sp·ring, with other people, and although we 
are not on the same pip·eline, and taking an-
other pipeline from this spring probably 
would enter into some problem with the other 
co-owners of the spring, which we had not 
discussed at this time, and so Mr. Waters 
and I talked this over. 
"I wanted him to fully understand the con-
ditions of the spring, and we discussed various 
ways we might get this share of the water that 
would go to me. 
"And we had also the problem of the time of 
year which we would construct the new pipeline 
inasmuch as we would have to go through growing 
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crops, and these all were problems that 've dis-
cussed. 
"Now we didn't come to any specific under-
standing on what kind of an arrangement we 
would make. These were thillgs that we tenta-
tively set aside to talk about before 've made our 
final agreement." 
Also, under the evidence the jury could find that no 
specific reference in the contract vv-as to be made relative 
to the defendant being permitted to use the 1nilking fa-
cilities if he needed them (173) or whether there was to 
be a specific reference in the contract to the fact that the 
heater was to be left in the milkhouse (185). With these 
subjects which the jury could have found were not to be 
in the sales contract but v.rere to be left for future deter-
mination, the court unduly and incorrectly limite·d this 
field to the two specific p·roposi tions relating to posses-
sion date of the property as a 'vhole and to the date of oc-
cupation of the home located on the ranch. Because of 
these other areas which could be left for future determin-
ation, the trial court's method of submitting this proposi-
tion to the jury 'vas inaccurate, incorreet and misleading. 
Also, there was e·vidence that there was some ques-
tion about the descriptions of the property which the jury 
under the instructions could have believed prevented an 
agreement on "all terms" (212, 228). 
Analysis of Instruction 9-G (74) given by the trial 
court shows it to be confusing and misleading. The~re 
are only two distinct propositions considered in this in-
struction, one is the matter of the possession of the ranch 
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and the second is the occupancy of the home. The court 
stated to the jury in this instruction that if the housing 
problem was left to future determina:tion but all other 
terms had been agreed to, then they should answer that 
the p~roposition submitted was true. Then comes the next 
paragr.ap~h in which the trial court states that if the de-
fendant and Mr. Waters did not agree on when, under 
the proposed written contract of sale, either the posses-
sion of the ranch was to be taken or the house was to he 
taken by ~fr. Waters, then they should answer the propo-
sition No. 1 as false. 
This is an incorreet statement of the law for the 
reason that if the parties wanted to agree that there 
would be a sale and they would enter into a contract for 
the sale and leave for future dete~rmination both the 
matter of possession and house occupancy, nevertheless 
the proposition should be answered true. The trial 
court should not he p~ermitted to dictate to which terms 
of sale the parties we~re required to agree. The only 
issue was whether plaintiff h.ad procured a person who 
was ready, able and willing to buy the property upon 
such p~rice and terms as defendant and Mr. \\T aters might 
agree upon during the life of the listing contract. 
We respectfully submit that the trial court com-
mitte~d e~rror in not submitting the case to the jury in 
accordanc:e with the requests above indicated made by 
plaintiff. We further submit that the trial court com-
mitted error in submitting the case to the jury under its 
Proposition 1 and Instruction 9-G for the re-ason that 
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these instructions constituted an inaccurate and incorrect 
statement of the law and in view of the evidence intro-
duced the matter of what could be left to future deter-
mination was p~rejudicially limited by these instructions. 
POIN'T II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN DEFENDANT 
AND WATERS WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE. 
The trial court instructed the jury in its Instruction 
No. 9-F (78) as follows: 
"You are instructed that under the Utah 
statutes, an agreement to buy real estate is not 
enforceable unless such .agreement is in writing 
and is signed by the party to be bound. Therefore, 
J. Holman Waters could not have been legally held 
by the defendant Loertscher and could not have 
been required in law to have complied with or 
performed .any oral agreement, if any, which the 
buyer and seller may have made or reached. 
"You are further instructed that in order for 
the parties to the sale to have reached a complete 
understanding it was unnecessary for the agree-
ment to be binding on the seller and the buyer. 
There could be an agreeme~nt within the terms of 
the listing contract without said agreement being 
a binding agreement between the buyer and the 
seller." 
There 'vas absolutely no issue joined on this sub-
ject. Of course, the contract bHtween defendant and 
Mr. Waters was oral and therefore unenforceable agamst 
Mr. Waters or against defendant, but that was not the 
issue involved here. The issue was whether or not plain-
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tiff had produced a person who was ready, able and 
willing to purchase the property. 
This instruction of necessity was p·rejudicial to 
plaintiff because it informed the jury that defendant was 
not in a position to enforce the contract against \Vaters. 
The prejudicial nature of this becomes apparent when 
we· turn to the testimony of defendant wherein he stated 
(236): 
''Q. You had talked during this period of time-
from January or February, up until this 
period of time-Let's say February on-you 
talked to p·eople about buying your property. 
I thought you ~testified to that~ 
A. I did attempt to try to make a deal. I couldn ~t 
close the deal because I had no signed con-
tract with Mr. Waters." 
The second paragraph does not eliminate the preju-
dicial nature of the first paragraph in the instruction. 
We are unable to make any determination of 'vhat 
possible eonnection this instruction had with the case 
other than to give the jury the understanding that plain-
tiff's effort had resulted in no legally enfoceable rights 
bestowed upon defendant. 
How could it possibly be proper for the trial court 
to say that the agreement is void but that makes no 
difference~ If it makes no difference then nothing should 
be said about it. This red herring never should have 
been dragged across the path of this jury as the·y sought 
to decide this case·. 
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In Gray v. Blake, 128 Colo. 381, 262 P.2d 741 (1953), 
an action was brought to recover a co1nmission. Plaintiff 
claimed to have produced a purchaser for certain real 
estate-. A jury returned a verdict for defendant. On 
appeal this was reversed. The court there instructed 
the jury as follows: 
"The agreement attached to the complaint and 
marked Exhibit 'A' is not a contract of sale· such 
as creates an obligation on the part of the defend-
ant to sell or the plaimtiff to buy, but is merely an 
option giving the right to p~urchase within a limit-
ed time without imposing any obligation to pur-
chase." 
The word "plaintiff" obviously is in error and re-
ferred to the alleged purchaser. In holding this instruc-
tion reversible error the court stated: 
"By Instruction No.7, above quoted, the trial 
court in effect told the jury that Gray had not per-
formed his part of the agreement with Blake and 
that the offer and tender of Kincheloe ·was with-
out force or effect as regards the service p~laintiff 
claimed he had performed. By telling the jury in 
Instruction No. 7 that Exhibit 'A' was not a con-
tract of sale, in view of all the attendant facts 
shown by the rooords, the trial court erred. As an 
abstract proposition of law Instruction No. 7 
doubless is correct, yet it had no applicability to 
the facts in the instant case and could only serve 
to confuse the jury." 
The Utah Supreme Court has reversed cases because 
the trial court instructed the jury on matters having no 
relation to the genuine isuses of the case. See, for ex-
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ample: Moore v. D&RGW RR Co., 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 
P.2d 849 (1956). 
We submit that prejudicial error was p·erpetrated 
when the trial court gave this wholly irrelevant instruc-
tion pointed toward giving the defendant an advantage 
to which he was not entitled. 
POIN·T III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INS'TRUCTING THE 
JURY THAT THE WRIT'TEN OFFER DID NOT COMPLY 
WITH THE LIS'TING AGREEMENT. 
The trial court instructed the jury as follows (75): 
"No. 9-C 
"You are instructed that, as a matter of law, 
the evidenc-e shows that the only written offer se-
cured by the plaintiff from anyone to purchase 
the prop!erty listed by the defendant was the writ-
ten offer, dated February 20, 1959, and signed by 
J. Holman Waters of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
''You are further instructed that, as a matter 
of law, said written offer was not at the price nor 
in accordance with the terms of the listing agree-
ment, and the Court, therefore, instructs 3..-ou that, 
as a matter of law, the securing of this written 
offer would not comply with the listing agree-
ment. The defendant was not required to accept it, 
and the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff for 
the plaintiff's having secured said written offer." 
Here, .again, a red herring was inserted into the case. 
There was no contention at any time that the written 
offer of F:ebruary 20, 1959, was in compliance with the 
te·rms of the listing agreement (117). This was not an 
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issue in this case and had nothing at all to do with the 
final result. Here, again, the instruction is pointed to-
ward showing the plaintiff had not given the defendant 
an enforceable right and advised the jury concerning an 
issue which they could not even consider in connection 
with answering either of the prop·ositions suhmi:tted to 
them. We rely on the cases cited in Point II to indicate 
that this constituted prejudicial error. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY THA:T IF THE PARTIES AGREED 
TO THE PRICE AND 'TERMS FOR 'THE SALE AND DE-
FENDANT LATER :CALLED THE TRANSACTION OFF, 
PLAINTIFF· WAS EN'TITLED TO A VERDICT. 
The plaintiff reques:ted the trial court to instruct 
the jury as follows ( 48): 
"Defendant, in the listing agreement of Feb-
ruary 14, 1959, agreed to pay to plaintiff a $5,000 
commission if plaintiff found a buyer who was 
ready, able and willing to buy the real e~state here 
involved at the price and terms set forth in the 
listing agreement or at any other price or terms 
which defendant might agree to. 
"Therefore, if you find by a p·erp·onderance 
of the evidence, that defendant produced J. Hol-
man Waters as a buyer, that the defendant and J. 
Holman Waters agreed to the p~rice and terms 
for the sale of the real estate involved, and that 
defendant later called the transaction off, then 
you should return a verdict in favor of plaintiff 
and against defendant for the sum of $5,000.00. '' 
That this is a correct statement of the law clearly 
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appears from Curtis v. Mortensen, 1 Utah 2d 354, 267 
P. 2d 237; see annotation 169 A.L.R. 605. 
Plaintiff requested this instruction because it fol-
lowed the testimony of Mr. \Vaters and if the jury be-
lieved as Mr. Waters had testified then a verdict should 
l1ave been returned in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendant. This instruction was given to emphasize the 
proposition that if the agreen1ent had been reached and 
defendant called the transaction off, then and in that 
event, plain tiff \vas still entitled to recover. ·Certainly, in 
view of the fact that the court gave Instructions 9-C, 9-D, 
and 9-F expressing evidence favorable to defendant this 
instruction should have been given in all fairness to 
plaintiff. 
We submit prejudicial error was committed in the 
refusal of the coulit to submit this instruction to the jury. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE 
JURY PROPOSITION NO. 2 AS TO WHETHER AT THE 
TIME THE LISTING AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED BY DE-
FENDAN'T PLAINTIFF KNEW THAT DEFENDANT'S WIFE 
WAS A CO-OWNER OF THE PROPERTY. 
By Instruction 9-E the court instructed the jury as 
follows (77) : 
''You are instructed that the defendant, 
Loertscher, contends that at the time the listillg 
was given to the plaintiff Smith, Mr. Smith lmew 
that the wife of Mr. Loertscher was a joint o\\rner 
of the property. Mr. S1nith denies that he had 
such lmowledge. It is not necessary to Your de-
cision for the Court to instruct yo~ on the legal 
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consequences of the existence or la.ck of such 
knowledg·e, but you are instructed to resolve this 
conflict by ans,vering the following question 
"At the time the listing agreement was signed 
by the defendant, did the plaintiff know that Mrs. 
Loertscher, the wife of the defendant, was a co-
owner of the property~" 
Also, the court submitted to the jury Proposition 
No.2 as follows (84) : 
"P ·t·· N 2 ropOSl lOll 0. • 
"At the time the listing agreement was signed 
by the defendant, the plaintiff lrnew that Mrs. 
Loertscher, the wife of the defendant, was a co-
owner of the p~roperty. 
There was no evidence which would justify a finding 
,that at the time the listing agreement was signed plain-
tiff had any knowledge that defendant's wife was a co-
owner of the p·roperty. Mr. Smith did not call for a legal 
description of the property and did not make any exam-
ination of the records until February 19th, five days after 
the listing contract was signed (162). Plaintiff also testi-
fied that he had no knowledge until the new plats had 
com~ out some time later that defendant's wife had any 
interest in this prop~erty (238). 
Defendant testified he gave the valuation notice to 
plaintiff after the listing agreement had been signed 
(219). This is the only way that plaintiff could have 
received any notice of who owned the property and this 
shows it was after the agreement had been signed. De-
fendant testified as follows (218, 219): 
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"Q. Mr. Loertscher, as I understand your testi-
mony in connection with this valuation notice, 
you say you gave that to ~fr. Smith, after 
the listing agreement had been signed~ 
A. That's right .. He asked me as he was leaving 
if I had ~orne identification. I said 'I have got 
a rTax evaluation notice' so I just went back 
in and gave it to him. 
Q. Did you eve-r give him any other tax valuation 
notices~ 
A. No." 
Also, defendant conceded that on his deposition he 
testified that he did not turn OiVer the valuation notice 
to plaintiff until .after Mr. Waters had been up to the 
ranch. This was two or three days after the listing agree-
ment had been signed and executed (219, 220). Also, 
this proposition was absolutely immaterial because there 
never was any contention at any time that defendant's 
wife objected to the, sale or would not sign the contract. 
As a matter of fact she was eognizant of the fact that 
the prop·erty was being listed for sale. She was present 
when conversations were had at the attorney's office 
(174, 214) She was consulted by her husband as to the 
time when possession should be given to nir. waters 
(168, 222). Never at any tune did she object to the sale 
or indicate that she was displeased with it. 
There are three versions as to the reason defendant 
gave in explaining why the transaction was not closed 
by written agreement. Plaintiff testified that on March 
31 defendant stated to plaintiff that he had come down 
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to tell him that he was calling off the deal. He stated that 
he was not going to move down to the Peterson ranch 
and that he was going to sell all of it (140). Mr. Waters 
testified when defendant ca.me to his plac1e in the latter 
part of 1iarch, or ,the forepart of April, he stated: ''Hol-
man, I can't sell you the ranch.'' He gave as a reason that 
he couldn't get out of his cows and milk base what he had 
to get and he did not know wha,t to do. Mr. W ate~rs 
pointed out that he had been counting on moving his 
cattle on to this ranch and defendant replied that he did 
not want to put him on the spot and that if Mr. Waters 
had no plaee to send his cattle he might rent him some 
pasturage (178). Defendant testified he had come out 
to 1\fr. W ate~rs to see if he could "get more time beyond 
the possession date'' or else he could not go through with 
the deal and Mr. Waters refused to make any e~tension 
of time (216). 
Thus it can be clearly seen that the defendant's wife's 
participation or refusal to p~articipate in this sale has 
nothing at all to do with the issues. Again, we have an 
immaterial issue placed in the path of the jury and it 
could have no possible implication other than unfavorable 
to plaintiff in that it indicated he was attempting to sell 
somebody's land from whom he had no listing agreement. 
In any event the weight of authority is to the effeet 
that the fact that a wife is a co-owne~r of the property 
does not afford to the husband who has listed his prop~­
erty a defense against paying a commission. See Mc'-
Alinden v. Nelson, 121 c·ai. App. 2d 136, 2'62 P.2d 6~27, 
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Schurz v. Gelber, 117 A.C.A. 857, 256 P. 2d 634, Traxler 
v. McLeran, 116 ·Cal. App. 226, 2 P. 2d 553, Russell v. 
Ramm, 200 Cal. 348, 254 Pac. 532, Johnson v. K rver, 59 
Cal. App. 330, 210 Pac. 966, Pliler v. ThompsO'n, 84 Okla. 
200, 202 Pae. 1016, Kaufman v. Haney, 80 Cal. App·. 2d 
249, 182 P. 2d 250. Also the listing agreement (Exhibit 
1) showed only defendant as owner and to show owner-
ship of another would violate the parole evidence rnl'e. 
Diamond v. Chiate, 81 Ariz. 86, 300 P. 2d 583. 
CONCLUSION 
In tllis case there was a decided conflict in the testi-
mony of the witnesses. This being so, it became very im-
portant that careful and partial instructions should be 
given to the jury so that the case could be considered 
by the jury free of any influence from prejudicial ill-
s tructions. 
·Th1e case was not presented to the jury on a propo-
sition which aecurately set forth the issue to be deter-
mined. 
On the other hand, the instructions given 'Yere not 
only confusing, but also misleading, as indicated by the 
foregoing arguments. Also, a number of instructions 
were given which slanted the jury's vie·w .. s toward the 
defendant arid we submit did have a great influence upon 
the verdict returne·d. There was no reason for telling 
the jury that the oral agreement was unenforceable, 
that the written offer did not comply with the lis·ting 
agreement and that the plaintiff was attempting to sell 
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property which did not belong to the p,erson with whom 
he contracted. We submit that each of these errors were 
prejudicial to plaintiff and certainly the accumulation of 
errors in these instructions constituted p~rejudice to 
plaintiff. 
We respectfully submit that this ·Court should re-
verse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS 
Counsel for PlaintiJff 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
